

The Process for Determining Military Tasks in Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Sandra L. Newett • Laura A. Trader

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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE July 1997	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Process for Determining Military Tasks in Humanitarian Assistance Operations			5. FUNDING NUMBERS C - N00014-96-D-0001	
6. AUTHOR(S) SL Newett, LA Trader				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for Naval Analyses 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER CRM 97-72	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) Between 1994 and 1996, CNA conducted a study to determine ways in which the Marine Corps could improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). The study identified requirements for HAOs and alternative ways to meet those requirements. CNA found that some HAO tasks match warfighting tasks, such as operating a reverse osmosis water purification unit. Many HAO tasks are similar to warfighting tasks, but by have a different focus. For example, in an HAO, logistics may be the primary mission rather than a support function for the primary mission of warfighting. In addition, some tasks in HAOs are completely different warfighting tasks, such as using the military to support civilian organizations rather than as the focus of an operation. In this analysis, we address the following question: How can the military adapt to the HAO environment so that appropriate military tasks can be determined? Our analysis focuses on how to derive tasks, particularly implied tasks, in HAOs. We define implied tasks as those tasks that have not been specified to accomplish or not, but that need to be conducted to accomplish the mission.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Bosnia, Humanitarian Assistance Operation (HAO), joint military activities, military assistance, military doctrine, military operations, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Restore Hope, requirements, Somalia, training			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 55	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

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Introduction

Background and objective

Between 1994 and 1996, CNA conducted a study to determine ways in which the Marine Corps could improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs) [1 through 14]. The study identified requirements for HAOs and alternative ways to meet those requirements. CNA found that some HAO tasks match warfighting tasks, such as operating a reverse osmosis water purification unit. Many HAO tasks are similar to warfighting tasks, but may have a different focus. For example, in an HAO, logistics may be the primary mission rather than a support function for the primary mission of warfighting. In addition, some tasks in HAOs are completely different from warfighting tasks, such as using the military to support civilian organizations rather than as the focus of an operation.

The military knows how to derive tasks from warfighting missions. Military forces have learned to adapt to the warfighting environment—their focus is on warfighting, and they've trained and exercised warfighting so that they know which tasks, both specified and implied, need to be conducted to accomplish their mission. However, HAOs present a different environment that the military needs to adapt to. The military has not had adequate training [15] to derive tasks from the HAO mission—which is often vague—and the situation surrounding the mission. In this analysis, we address the following question: *How can the military adapt to the HAO environment so that appropriate military tasks can be determined?*

Our analysis focuses on how to derive tasks, particularly implied tasks, in HAOs. We define implied tasks as those tasks that have not been specified to accomplish or not, but that need to be conducted to accomplish the mission. For HAOs the military has no long-standing tools to help them adapt to an HAO environment and thus, develop the appropriate tasks. Although some tools used to derive tasks for

warfighting can be used as a guide for planning HAOs (e.g., crisis action planning procedures), what the tasks are, why these tasks are needed, and how these tasks should be conducted may differ.

Approach

To address how the military can adapt to the HAO environment, we identified the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff process for determining military tasks in humanitarian operations. By “process” we mean the series of actions or operations directed toward a particular result. In other words, process involves *determining the appropriate actions to take* to achieve specific results. This is different from procedures, which are a series of predetermined steps followed in a particular order [16]. We identified a process rather than procedures because the actions taken in an HAO should be a function of the results the military is trying to achieve rather than a series of predetermined steps (such as standard operating procedures) that may be inappropriate for achieving the desired results. By understanding the process, the military can go back and document the procedures it went through after the operation. Although these procedures may not apply to the next HAO, the process will still hold.

Our analysis focuses on the process the CJTF and his staff should use to derive tasks. The JTF needs information from the strategic level as well as the operational level to derive the tasks they should conduct in HAOs. The information that is needed defines the process. We structure the process in a framework familiar to military operators. In a subsequent paper we will identify training programs in which this process should be implemented.

Methodology

Using this approach, we identified the information a CJTF and his staff should consider when determining military tasks for a humanitarian assistance operation. To identify the information, we looked at:

- Past operations to understand what key decisions were made and factors that influenced these decisions


- Lessons learned from the operations (why things were done well or not well)
- How they decided what to do
- In general, what was done during planning and execution of the operation.

We looked at a wide spectrum of humanitarian operations from purely humanitarian to primarily security with the potential for humanitarian operations:

- Sea Angel—a disaster relief operation that took place in Bangladesh in May 1991
- Operation Provide Comfort—a humanitarian operation that began in April 1991 in support of the Iraqi Kurds, who fled to the mountains in fear of Saddam Hussein
- Operation Restore Hope—an operation that began in December 1991 in Somalia to aid in the provision of humanitarian relief
- Operation Joint Endeavor—an operation in Bosnia that started in December 1995 in support of implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord.

Our first step was to identify a generic framework for task development (the framework is described in more detail in the next section). Our second step was to understand and decipher the HAO environment. We did this by drawing out common themes—or “issues”—from our four operations. The issues are the vital decision-making points common to these operations. In the third step, we identified broad categories for the issues, which we call “conceptual elements.” The conceptual elements are political considerations, military planning considerations, and civil-military relations. These conceptual elements and their defining issues describe the HAO environment into which a CJTF and his staff must adapt. The framework combined with the conceptual elements and issues define the HAO process for determining tasks. Figure 1 illustrates this methodology.

Figure 1. Steps to identify issues and elements that define the HAO environment



To understand why the issues and elements reflect different tasks or reasons for conducting those tasks, we tried to show how the resulting HAO tasks would be different. We provide sample tasks that can be derived from the issues.

The process

In this section, we present the framework we derived using the data culled from the operations mentioned earlier. We focus on HAO issues and conceptual elements and how they fit into the framework. Then we present examples of how these issues and conceptual elements can influence task development.

Framework

Through our analysis we identified a framework of steps (milestones) that describe the military process for HAO task development.¹ The first step (milestone) is the crisis situation, which we call *context*. The context describes not only the situation on the ground but the political milieu surrounding the crisis. Based on the context, the decision to intervene is made and the U.S. *national objectives* are stated. By national objectives, we mean what the President publicly states as the purpose for U.S. intervention.² The *military mission* is derived from the national objectives and the context; the CJTF and his staff derive *tasks* from the mission, national objectives, and context. Figure 2 shows this framework. The arrows in figure 2 represent the HAO environment that we will identify below—the issues a CJTF and his staff should consider to develop appropriate tasks—within the framework.


HAO environment

In HAOs, the CJTF and his staff must adapt to the HAO environment. Their ability to adapt to HAOs is linked to their understanding of this HAO environment in which they will operate. We identified three

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1. This framework can also apply to a warfighting situation.
 2. These objectives may not always be given before the military begins their planning, in which case the military may have more influence over the national objectives [17].

conceptual elements that are important to a CJTF and his staff in an HAO: political considerations, military planning considerations, and civil-military relations. These conceptual elements generally describe the key issues. Within the conceptual elements, the key issues ultimately influence the military's tasks in HAOs. The appendix shows the data from the four operations from which we derived the conceptual elements and issues associated with HAOs.

Figure 2. The framework for the HAO task development process



Political considerations

Because the military is one of several foreign policy tools, political considerations are part of all military operations. However, the political consideration for HAO interventions have a different focus from

warfighting. The information needed to make a decision for intervention and the national objectives for an intervention will be different—they are humanitarian related versus warfighting in nature. As such, the military has not been trained and educated in depth to derive appropriate tasks from these political considerations [1 through 14].

Although the key issues listed below are of importance in warfighting, the tasks associated with these issues will often be different. These issues will be discussed in more depth later in the paper. The key issues associated with political considerations are:

- *Influence for intervention.* The type of crisis and who will likely have an influential opinion on intervention.
- *Ongoing diplomatic efforts.* The efforts the U.S. and the international community are expending on the crisis.
- *Design of the coalition.* The members of the coalition and what are their capabilities and support requirements.

Military planning considerations

The focus of this conceptual element is the issues the CJTF and his staff needs to consider during military planning for HAOs. Because the U.S. national objectives in an HAO are different from those in a warfighting operation, the mission will also be different. For example, end state will not be surrender, as it has been in some wars, but something less clear such as a “secure” environment. See [1 through 14] for more details on differences. The associated issues with military planning include:

- The military’s role—The balance between the goals and efforts of the diplomats, the military and the humanitarian community
- End state—As part of the mission statement, the end state defines the conditions under which the military can redeploy
- Transition—The terms under which military will turn over its responsibilities to a follow-on organization

- Civil-military relations—The military and civilian organizations, such as NGOs, that must work together.

Civil-military relations

Because civil-military relations on the ground is the major difference between HAOs and warfighting, we separate it out as the third conceptual element, even though it is part of military planning. Regardless of the type of operation, warfighting or HAO, the military has to coordinate with other participants. HAOs bring in an additional set of participants, such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, host nation government, and so forth. The key issue we found associated with civil-military relations is coordination: The military (and civilian organizations) needs to know who to coordinate with, what to coordinate, and how to coordinate.


Summary of HAO environment

Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual elements and issues (described in the previous section) as a whole and where they fit into the framework.

Applying the above conceptual elements and their associated key issues to our framework will help a CJTF and his staff identify the information needed to develop their tasks. For example, the military chain of command begins with the National Command Authority (NCA). They are not military operators and, thus, are not as familiar with how to plan military operations. The NCA will define national objectives, but the military must translate those objectives into a military mission and tasks. Understanding national objectives and motivations will give the commander more flexibility to interpret tasks rather than adhering to the specified tasks in the mission. A CJTF and his staff already do this for warfighting—they have been taught to pull out implied tasks from context, the national objectives, and mission. The military needs to be taught how to do this for HAOs.

The next sections discuss the above discussed conceptual elements and issues in detail as part of the framework.

Figure 3. Summary of elements and issues within our framework



Completing the HAO task development process

The framework shown in figure 2 is the skeleton for the HAO task development process that we derived from the data. We present the conceptual elements and issues in more detail associated with the arrows in the framework, and their task implications in this section, which will complete the process for determining HAO tasks. These findings will be presented relative to the steps in the process—first, applying the context to national objectives, and then applying national objectives to the mission and tasks.

Context → national objectives

In this section, we discuss the conceptual elements and issues and their task implications associated with getting from context to national objectives. Table 1 shows these issues from which we derived the conceptual element, political considerations. The appendix contains the operation-specific data from these past operations from which we derived these issues.

Table 1. Outline of the issues and sub-issues associated with political considerations

Influence for intervention
Nature of crisis
Root problem
Symptom of problem
View of crisis
Congress
Public
Media
International community
U.S. government agencies
NGOs
UN
Host nation government
Host nation population
Neighboring nations
Ambassador
Diplomatic efforts
Design of coalition
Who
Why
Support requirements
Capabilities
Strategic command relations

From table 1, the three key issues that have task implications that result from the context to national objectives part of the process are influence for intervention, diplomatic efforts, and the design of the

coalition. As mentioned earlier, these general issues are relevant to warfighting but the tasks associated with these issues or how the tasks are conducted may be different. We will illustrate some of these differences in the following subsections.

Influence for intervention

We found two subordinate issues that influence the decision for military intervention that may have task development implications for the CJTF and his staff: *the nature of the crisis* and *the different views of the crisis*.

Understanding the crisis requires identifying the root problem and the symptoms of the problem. The root and symptoms of the problem have task development implications. The national objectives may address the root problem causing the crisis and/or the symptoms resulting from the root problem. By symptoms, we mean something that is an outward manifestation of the root problem. If the national objectives address the root problem, the military will have at least some specified tasks addressing the root problem.³ But the military may have implied tasks associated with the symptoms in addition to the root problem. These implied tasks may not be initially apparent to the CJTF and his staff because they have not been trained to automatically derive these implied tasks. They have been trained to derive implied tasks from warfighting situations.

For example, the Dayton Peace Accord was a vehicle to address part of the root problem of warring parties in Bosnia. The Implementation Force (IFOR) and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Operation Joint Endeavor was assigned to enforce the military part of the Dayton Accord and had the firepower to enforce Party Compliance. But the military did not have direct responsibility to address the symptoms of the problem, such as refugees, and the absence of an elected government and a police force. Although civilian agencies and the

3. We say *some* tasks will address the problem because there are cases in which this is not true. In Joint Endeavor, the military is creating a secure environment. However, the security situation will not be stabilized without dealing with the war criminals, a large part of the security problem. One and a half years into its mission, NATO forces in Bosnia began to apprehend war criminals [18].

local population are suppose to address some of these “symptoms,” the military has been given supporting tasks in the Dayton Accord to support the implementation of the civilian objectives [19]:

The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, which include the following:

- a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections;
- b. to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
- c. to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;
- d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and,
- e. to monitor the clearing of mine fields and obstacles....

IFOR has provided support for the civilian objectives of the Dayton Peace Accord, on a case-by-case basis, despite its (IFOR) and higher authority’s desire to keep the military and civilian tasks separate—giving the military a limited mission. For example, although the military had specific supporting tasks to provide security for free and fair elections, the military supported this task only after direction by higher authority. IFOR did not automatically derive this task.

In other cases, the national objectives address the symptoms of the problem. As a result, the military will have implied tasks associated with the root problem on the ground as well as tasks that address the symptoms as stated in the national objectives. For example, in Operation Provide Comfort, the military initially was tasked to provide aid to the Kurds in the mountains on the Iraq-Turkey border. Later, this mission changed to bringing the Kurds out of the refugee camps and resettling them in their homes in Iraq. To complete this mission, the military forces needed to confront the Iraqi Army and secret police

operating in the resettlement zone, the same forces that caused the Kurds to flee in the first place. This confrontation, which turned out to be more of a negotiation and show of force, was not a specified task, but an implied one [20]. Although negotiating takes place in warfighting, what is being negotiated is different and implied: the return of refugees, in this case.

Another influence for intervention that may also influence the national objectives is the differing *views of the crisis*. The U.S. population may pressure Congress or the President for the U.S. government to provide some type of support to a crisis. The international community may also put pressure on the United States to intervene in the crisis as a world leader. This pressure may influence the decision to intervene as well as the national objectives. This pressure could be an outcome of perception (national and/or international) of the situation. For example, often the media brings a crisis to the attention of the U.S. population and others. However, the media may show only part of the story. In Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, the media story was feeding starving children. "Images that reinforced that belief [of starving children] were used, were printed. Images that contrasted...were downplayed either by the reporter or the gatekeeper [i.e., the editors]." ⁴ The result was that the U.S. public did not get the whole story and was surprised by the violence that came later. The view of the symptom as the root problem will influence the need for implied tasks associated with the root problem, which may not be apparent due to the military's lack of education on HAOs. Table 1 shows others may have points of view that could influence the national objectives for U.S. intervention.

Diplomatic efforts

The CJTF and his staff should *understand what U.S. diplomatic efforts are ongoing* because the JTF may have tasks associated with these efforts. These tasks could include supporting or enforcing the results of diplomatic efforts. For example, in Joint Endeavor, the military is

4. This quote is taken from a speech made by Mr. Thomas A. Ricks, the Pentagon correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal*, at CNA's Annual Conference in 1995 [21].

enforcing the military annex of the Dayton Peace Accord (a diplomatic tool) and supporting the civilian parts of the Accord on a case-by-case basis. The JTF could also be part of these diplomatic efforts. In Restore Hope, the military worked with Ambassador Robert Oakley, the U.S. special envoy in Somalia, to negotiate U.S. involvement.⁵ Although military negotiation has taken place in warfighting, the subject of that negotiation is humanitarian or in support of humanitarian objectives, rather than warfighting objectives.

In Provide Comfort, LGEN Shalikashvili, the CJTF, met with the Iraqi General responsible for northern Iraq to inform the Iraqis that the Combined Task Force intended to secure the area and, as a result of that security, provide an opportunity for the Iraqi forces to withdraw peacefully. Although the Iraqis acknowledged the meeting, they didn't say that they would withdraw. With the unstated objective of avoiding fighting with the Iraqis, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in charge of securing the area had to be diplomatic and negotiate with first the Iraqi Army and then the Iraqi secret police for the Iraqi withdrawal as the MEU secured the area. As these examples illustrate, the CJTF may play the role of "diplomat" in these operations, whether at the strategic or operational levels. The role of diplomat in HAOs is usually implied—it is seldom a specified task. The military needs to recognize this as an implied task particularly when the national objectives address the symptoms of the problem.

Design of the coalition

A CJTF and his staff should understand the design of any coalition (warfighting as well as HAOs), particularly if they are going to be the lead for the coalition. Coalition forces may have different reasons for joining the coalition and those goals need to be coordinated. Some forces will need considerable support for the operation. Military personnel have said in the past that there should be limitations on who should be part of the coalition because of the burden some coalition forces can place on U.S. and other western forces [23].

5. Ambassador Oakley was not sent to negotiate a peace settlement between warlords but to negotiate the provision of aid [22].

However, viability of a military force is not always the only driver in coalition building. More likely, coalitions are created to lend political viability to a force [21]. Therefore, the State Department may agree to have military forces from other countries join the coalition that can be more of a hindrance than a help to the U.S. military due to supportability constraints [23]. The military needs to understand and accept coalition members including their goals, support requirements and *humanitarian* capabilities. Tasks associated with the design of coalition partners can include coordinating responsibilities (particularly in response to humanitarian capabilities), providing logistics and medical support, coordinating operating areas, and so forth.

Objective → mission → tasks

The next arrow in the framework, national objectives to mission, focuses on translating the national objectives into a military mission. The last arrow, mission to task, represents determining the appropriate HAO tasks derived from the mission. Both arrows have task development implications. The two conceptual elements associated with this part of the framework are military planning and civil-military relations.

Military planning considerations

The first element associated with getting from national objectives to mission to tasks is military planning. As mentioned, some of the planning tools the military can use for HAOs can be the same, but the tasks that result from planning may be different. The key issues we found that influence military planning are the military's role, end state, transition, and civil-military relations. The next subsection discusses these issues in more detail and presents sample tasks associated with these issues. Table 2 provides the issues associated with military planning considerations.

Military's role

Part of translating the national objectives into a military mission is defining the military's role. *The military defines its own role based on, and in conformity with, the national objectives and the need to interact with the others providing humanitarian assistance in HAOs.* The military's role reflects its relationship with political and humanitarian efforts, i.e., where the military operation fits into an HAO. Its role is a balance

between operational reality, political considerations, and humanitarian requirements.

Table 2. Outline of the issues associated with military planning considerations

Military Role

Balance of operational reality, political considerations, and humanitarian requirements

Operational Command relations

End state

Interpreting/translating from political view

Early withdrawal vs. operational solution

Explore options for long-term solution w/o military

End date vs. end state

Withdrawal given capabilities of organization

Balance of operational and strategic end states

Timing

Transition

When

Who

Capabilities

Culture

Goals

What

How

Plan with of organization

Pass along expertise

Civil-Military relations (see next figure)

Not every event or action can be predicted or written into a negotiated political settlement or a military OPLAN. The CJTF has to interpret and be able to adapt to the gray areas of an operation to identify the appropriate implied tasks. For example, because there was no precedent for the Dayton Peace Accord, what mattered to the former warring factions was IFOR interpretation of the agreement. For the first 45 days of Joint Endeavor, COMIFOR went through a testing period [17]:

...Parties and NGOs/IOs [with] their own agenda sought IFOR interpretation of the GFAP [Dayton Peace Accord] on the ground. Much of this attention involved responding to pressures to expand or more broadly interpret the IFOR military mission. Throughout this period, COMIFOR was put in a position of adapting to the combination of political/media pressure events on the ground, while at the same time remaining consistent in terms of the IFOR military mission.

The interaction of the political, humanitarian relief, and the military demands will generate implied tasks. Being able to anticipate the type of tasks that can arise will help the CJTF determine his tasks in terms of what to do and what to avoid. For instance, at the start of Restore Hope, the UN wanted the U.S.-led UNITAF to disarm the Somalis, but the UNITAF mandate did not include general disarmament [22]. The U.S. resisted disarmament because it thought it would require a long-term commitment [24]. The humanitarian participants disagreed with disarmament because it had a negative impact on their operations. The trucks they leased to deliver relief supplies came with armed guards. If these guards were not permitted to carry guns, the trucks could not be leased [25]. However, because of the security situation in Mogadishu and the possibility for hostilities, UNITAF did have to adjust its mandate temporarily and institute disarmament policy [26].

How the military plans to structure the interaction with the humanitarian organizations will influence its tasking. For example, the military might establish a coordination or liaison cell with the relief organizations. As mentioned earlier, the decision by the U.S. government (unlike the UN) to take a narrow political stand to address only the starvation and not the cause of the starvation in Somalia influenced the national objectives of creating a secure environment and assisting the relief community. Military planners from the CINC, the CJTF, and their staffs turned the national objectives into a four-phase operation. Part of the tasking was to establish a coordination mechanism with the relief community. The military took the initiative to set up the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) and spell out its responsibilities and tasking to support relief organizations.

End state

For HAOs, the end state may be the “creation of a secure environment” or “an end to the starvation.” In the world of politics these terms may be clear, but for the military they are ambiguous because they don’t address how or to what degree an environment is secure. *HAO military planners, as part of developing the mission, need to define an end state that all participants can understand.*

The end state and incorporating it into the mission will influence task development. Lately, the military enters HAOs with a publicly stated fixed time commitment.⁶ The time line can either be event-driven or time-driven; however, a set of conditions under which forces can redeploy is defined. The end state has to be consistent with the national objectives (even though they may be defined in vague terms).

Developing a viable end state may be a matter of balancing political and operational views of the situation on the ground. The military will want to transition and redeploy as soon as it accomplishes its mission, but the political realities may preclude this. Even if the military declares its mission complete, it is the President who decides when the military has reached its end state and can begin transitioning. The end state can be influenced by the follow-on organization (see the transition section below).

For Restore Hope, the UNITAF took the national objectives, translated them into a four-phase military mission, determined its tasks, executed these tasks, and accomplished what it had defined as its mission. The final phase of the mission was to transition to UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia) [26]; however, UNOSOM II wasn’t ready to take on the UNITAF’s tasks, in part because what UNITAF had

6. Although this may be the politically and militarily stated assumption, it has not always been the case. In northern Iraq, U.S. forces are still supporting Operation Provide Comfort from Turkey. In Bosnia, a follow-on NATO force with strong U.S. participation went into Bosnia for the politically stated end date of one year. However, by the end of the year it was apparent that the security mission was not completed—it could not be sustained if NATO forces left. A follow-on military force replaced IFOR.

done was not sustainable by a force of the size and capabilities of the UN peacekeeping force. When developing the tasks, UNITAF did not consider the potential problems of sustaining a secure environment.

In Provide Comfort, the humanitarian relief workers pointed out that the best way to help the Kurds was to return them to their villages rather than to sustain refugee camps. This required extending the security zone south to Dohuk, a town in which over a third of the refugees were from. To the military, this meant redeploying sooner because it would not have to operate refugee camps. To the President and other government officials this meant extending the military mission and the U.S. commitment [20,27].

Later tasking created an extended secure environment (to include Dohuk), which allowed the Kurds to return to their villages and shorten the ground troops' role in supporting the humanitarian effort. Redefining the end state as returning the Kurds to their villages instead of just getting the Kurds out of the mountains and into refugee camps proved to eliminate the need for extended ground troop commitment [27]. While U.S. forces (based in Turkey) are still present, their mission is to patrol the no-fly zone. It is not a humanitarian assistance operation.

Transition

What does the military do once it accomplishes its mission and reaches the agreed end state? It focuses on transitioning to a follow-on organization and redeploying.

The primary goal of the transition should be for it to be transparent [1, 2]. In order for a smooth transition to take place, the CJTF and his staff need to know the organization it is going to transition to, which is a political decision. Several military tasks are associated with how to make the transition. Once the follow-on organization has been determined, the CJTF and his staff must understand that organization's capabilities to take over the military responsibilities, what the goals of the organization are, and so forth. This information can be conveyed through early planning with the follow-on organization (or some other means during the operation, such as by e-mail or phone). In

turn, the follow-on organization must understand what responsibilities it will gain during the transition.

In Operation Provide Comfort, the combined task force moved refugee camp responsibilities to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These camps were temporary, a holding area for refugees returning to their homes. The transition was virtually transparent because the CJTF had ensured that the UN could take over the responsibilities [20].

Civil-military relations

All HAOs will involve civilians, whether it is NGOs or refugees or others. In most cases, the military will be involved in an HAO in support of civilian organizations or civilian populations. For example, a U.S. national objective may be to assist the humanitarian effort. However, "assist" leaves room for interpretation. The military must understand what assistance is needed and work with civilians such as NGOs as well as with the host nation efforts.

The key issue for the military is coordination with those organizations involved in the HAO. Table 3 lists the issues associated with civil-military relations.

Coordination

An HAO operation can encompass many potential participants. They can include neighboring nations (from the crisis area), the host nation government and population, refugees/displaced persons, NGOs, country team, Ambassadors, NATO organizations, U.S. government agencies, and others. Some or all participants can influence task requirements for the military, particularly if the military is in support of one or some of these civilian entities.

The military needs to understand what needs to be coordinated with the civil entities. Examples of the type of information to coordinate include the goals, operating areas, capabilities, support requirements, and functions of these organizations. Understanding these characteristics of the civilian entities will help shape the military tasks. For example, knowing the capabilities and operating characteristics of an

organization such as an NGO can reduce the possibility of duplicating tasks. In Provide Comfort, when Special Forces entered some of the mountain camps, Medicins Sans Frontieres and the Turkish Red Crescent were often already attending to the medical needs of the population. Instead of trying to set up their own medical organization, the Special Forces supported the organization already in place. They did not have to create a new organization. In other camps, however, NGOs and others were not providing aid, and the Special Forces then had to establish a medical organization [20].

Table 3. Outline of the issues associated with civil-military relations

Coordination	
Who	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Neighboring nations Allies Host nation Refugees/displaced persons Country team Ambassador Nato Agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> U.S. government International
What	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goals Operating areas Capabilities Support Functions
How	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMOC HACC MCC Civil affairs Phone


To understand *what* it needs to coordinate, the military needs to know *how* it should coordinate, which may have task implications. In almost

all HAOs with a military intervention, there has been some type of organization established to facilitate coordination among the military and civilian organizations. For example, in Restore Hope a civil-military coordination center was set up and run by civil affairs military personnel and others to facilitate coordination between NGOs and the military [25]. In Provide Comfort, the military established a military coordination cell to facilitate coordination between the Iraqi military and the Kurds. Broad tasks included setting up a coordination facility and manning and running it.

Insights from the HAO process

We've discussed the conceptual elements and issues associated with HAOs and why these conceptual elements and issues are important to a CJTF and his staff. The key elements and issues are illustrated in figure 4. Although at first glance the issues could be associated with warfighting, how these issues are addressed and the role they play to a CJTF and his staff are different for HAOs. By examining this process in total, we can draw several insights that can also help a CJTF and his staff plan and conduct an HAO.

Figure 4. Summary process for planning an HAO



The political/diplomatic, military, and humanitarian triad

The process we present is consistent with the triad—political/diplomatic, military, and humanitarian—that needs to be inextricably linked in HAOs with military intervention (see figure 5) [1,28]. When going from context to objectives, the issues associated with this part of the process are what influence the political decision to intervene and the national objectives for the intervention. These are political/diplomatic efforts that are influenced in part by military and humanitarian inputs. Going from national objectives to the mission to tasks in the process are military to military and military to humanitarian issues as well as political issues, such as end state. The process we present ensures that these entities are linked.⁷

Figure 5. HAO triad




7. All three sides of the triad are dependent on economics. Without money, HAOs could not take place. In this paper, we assume that the economics are there to support these operations.

The process and military decision-makers

Each step in the process can be associated with parts of the U.S. military chain of command. The first part of the process, from context to national objectives, can be associated with decisions the NCA or equivalent (the North Atlantic Council, NATO in Joint Endeavor, for example) makes, with input from the commander in chief (CINC). When going from national objective to mission to tasks, there is an exchange between the CINC and the (potential) CJTF and staff or equivalents (SACEUR and COMIFOR in Joint Endeavor). The CINC then derives the mission. Based on the mission, the national objectives, and the context, the CJTF determines the tasks to conduct, working with the humanitarian and civilian agencies. Figure 6 presents this concept from a military perspective.

Figure 6. Who in the military makes decisions in the HAO process



The framework and joint mission analysis

From a CJTF perspective, the framework with the conceptual elements and issues resembles joint mission analysis. During deliberate planning, mission analysis produces a mission statement. The mission statement forms the basis for the course of action development, staff estimates, and commander's estimate, all of which ultimately influence task development. The elements of the mission statement are who, what, where, when, why, and how [29]. Who, where, and when are questions that the situation or crisis itself answers. The key questions are the ones in which the answers must be derived, that is, why, what, and how.

Why

The framework outlines a process for developing military tasks for a humanitarian assistance operation. For the first arrow, context to national objective, the military may have an influence but it does not produce the output, a national objective. The military is just one of the potential political tools. Other tools include diplomacy, economic sanctions, or cutting off military or financial aid. National leaders can use the tools separately or in combination, depending on the crisis or situation. This first process addresses the purpose for the military's involvement. It produces the reason *why* the military has been chosen to intervene.

Whether the intervention is an NCA initiative or NCA is responding to pressure from Congress or the American public, to use the military option, policy-makers must define and defend the reason for its use. Because there can be other reasons for an HAO intervention than protecting a national interest, the national leaders must present a coherent reason for the intervention. These reasons are part of the context and are a defense of what becomes the national objectives.

What

The next part of the framework, national objective to mission, is where the military plays a much more active role in defining what its mission is going to be. The product or output of translating a national

objective to a military mission is a mission statement.⁸ A mission statement describes *what* the military is to do. The process of translating the national objectives into a military mission requires military planners to address the details of what the mission would entail for military forces in relation to the broader national objectives that include the other aspects of HAOs—diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. In cases where the military is operating in support of civilian organizations, the coordination effort between the military and the humanitarian side begins with developing the mission.

While the military can use traditional planning tools, such as crisis action planning, for HAOs, these operations bring nontraditional military issues into the planning process. We described these issues earlier: (1) defining the military's role in relation to the diplomatic and humanitarian efforts taking place at the same time, (2) defining the end state, and (3) transition. To develop the appropriate tasks, a mission has to address these issues.

How

The final process in the framework (see figure 6) is going from the mission to tasks.⁹ The associated issues in this process address the details of *how* to accomplish the mission. The *what* and *how* processes are closely related and are part of the back and forth process of military planning. This process mainly focuses on the tactical level of the forces on the ground and what particular individual tasks the force needs to execute in accordance with the mission. Civil-military relations play an important role at this level. Since the military is usually in support of civilians such as NGOs or a host nation, how they conduct their tasks will be influenced by these civilians. In Provide Comfort, it was the military on the ground and civilian relief workers that first identified the importance of returning the refugees to their villages and the need to increase the security zone. The military

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8. The mission statement contains the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for taking it [30].
 9. A task is the job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority [29].

negotiated with the Iraqi Army and secret police and then secured the expanded area allowing the refugees to return to their homes.

Conclusion

Through our analysis we set out to show how a CJTF and his staff could adapt to an HAO environment to determine the appropriate HAO tasks. The military has learned how to adapt to warfighting operations, but not necessarily to HAOs. While its planning procedures may be the same, the process for HAO task development is different. The process we describe is a combination of the framework and the conceptual elements and issues. The conceptual elements and issues provide the CJTF and his staff the key information they need for task development, particularly implied tasks. Our next task is to develop a training tool to convey the process to future CJTFs and their staffs.

Appendix

This appendix presents the data we gathered to determine the process for developing tasks in HAOs. We studied the following operations: Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Sea Angel, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Joint Endeavor. The references we used are shown in table 4.

Table 4. References for HAO data

Operation	Reference numbers
Operation Provide Comfort	20,23,27,31,3,33,34,35
Operation Sea Angel	23,36,37
Operation Restore Hope	22,23,24,25,26,38,39,40
Operation Joint Endeavor	17,19

Tables 5 through 8 show the data from Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Sea Angel, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Joint Endeavor, respectively.

Table 5. Outline of data for Operation Provide Comfort

Political considerations

- Influence for intervention
 - Nature of crisis
 - °Root problem
 - NCA recognized need for secure environment
 - Initiate operation under military
 - Restrict Iraqi planes south of 36th parallel
 - Operational security considerations
 - Send clear, concise, firm instructions to the opposing military
 - Establish patterns for military intervention
 - Let threat know intentions so no misunderstandings
 - Address offending party
 - Securing Dahouk
 - Agreement with Iraqis (threat)
 - Zakho vacated
 - °Symptoms of problem
 - Kurds flee to mountains
 - Starvation
 - Dehydration
 - Poor sanitation
 - Exposure
 - View of crisis
 - °Congress - stronger role for U.S. military in HAOs
 - °Refugee assistance - broad applications
 - °International - Joint sovereignty of the great powers to intervene in internal affairs of small countries
 - °Military
 - Unique aspects of operation are not fully understood
 - Could commit forces that would be difficult to resolve and disengage
 - °State saw need for assessment
 - Secretary Baker—highest political level, which set stage for the intervention
 - °Public support
 - Saddam snatching a victory from defeat
 - Outlaw image
 - Desperation of Kurds
 - °Multi-national forces
 - NGOs more willing to work with European forces
- Design of coalition
 - Strategic command relations
 - °State doesn't have knowledge of different Peacekeeping forces
 - °DoD and State need to coordinate to organize and plan for deployments

Table 5. Outline of data for Operation Provide Comfort (continued)

Military planning considerations

- Military role
 - Balance of strategic operational tactical goals for area addressed
 - °Could explore options for immediate long-term crisis solution
 - Avoid creating long-term refugee camps
 - Enter Zakho valley
 - People return to homes
 - Normalcy
 - Restart economy
 - Reempower population
 - Expand the security zone beyond Zakho
- End state
 - Interpreting/translating from political view
 - °Understanding location of refugee homes showed that small effort could solve problem
 - °Early withdrawal balanced with operational situation
 - Return refugees to Iraq rather than just feed them
 - °Withdrawal
 - Strategic level wanted secret withdrawal to avoid protests
 - Military wanted public withdrawal to avoid animosity
 - Resolution: incremental withdrawal
 - Balance of strategic and operational end states
 - °Pause at Dohouk
 - Policy-maker decision because of size of security zone
 - Appeared allies indecisive and hesitating
 - Relief demand escalated (Dahouk camp was supposed to be transitory not permanent)
 - Delayed operation completion and withdrawal
 - °Political problems
 - Tentativeness in D.C.—focus on getting troops out
 - Get right info into decision-makers' hands
 - Extent of operations and objectives need to be clear to all parties from the start
 - No vision of how "reconstruction" could speed withdrawal
 - Less reliance on external food by harvesting the crops
 - Timing of military departure
 - °Relied on return of refugees
 - °Very politicized
 - U.S. couldn't leave allies behind
 - Providing support to Kurds when others were suffering
 - U.S. presence in Turkey
 - °Incremental withdrawal
 - Announced
 - DART help with Kurds
 - Show protection
 - Signal Iraq that confident in withdrawal

Table 5. Outline of data for Operation Provide Comfort (continued)

- Transition
 - What
 - ° Post-departure security framework
 - Provide security from a distance
 - Who
 - ° Understand capabilities of follow-on organizations
 - Capabilities of UN to respond
 - UNHCR
 - Only intervenes at request of host nation govt
 - Relies on donors to operate

member state's sovereign territory

Table 5. Outline of data for Operation Provide Comfort (continued)

Civil-military relations

•Coordination

—What

- °Humanitarian and security aspects integrated
 - Civilian advisors facilitated transition

- °Turkish issues

- Identity of Kurds
 - Association with PKK violence
- Allies

Europe didn't want to accept Kurds but expected Turkey to accept
Turkey needed help and supported U.S. during DS

- UNSCR 688

Resulted from Ozals push to get U.S. and allies involved

—How

- °Integration of military and humanitarian objectives

- Humanitarian objectives integrated in military planning
 - DART

Overseas development administration

- °Establish formal channels for coordination with host nation

- Right initial forces sent (Special Forces)
 - Work through existing community structures
 - Helped develop overall return and resettlement strategy

- Use of civil affairs—linked

Already activated
Linked civilian populace and organization with military

—Who

- °NGOs

- Residual presence NGOs are unlikely to work under the military
- NGOs won't be around if there is not a large population at risk

- °Turkey

- °UN

- °DART

Table 6. Outline of data for Operation Sea Angel

Political considerations

- Nature of crisis
 - Root problem
 - ° Typhoon
 - Symptoms of problem
 - ° Islands inaccessible due to flooding
 - Dehydration
 - Starvation
 - ° Poor sanitary conditions
 - ° Disease
- View of crisis
 - Ambassador
 - ° Help needed immediately
 - Host nation
 - ° New government needed help
 - Media
 - ° Angels from the sea

Military planning considerations

- Military role
 - Balance of strategic operational tactical goals for area addressed
 - ° Host nation newly elected
 - ° Required small footprint
 - Sea-based
 - Ferrying of military personnel from ships
 - Refueling at sea
 - ° Delivery of supplies
 - Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC)
 - Helos
 - Airlift
 - Command relations
 - ° Amphibious Task Force (ATF) in support of JTF
 - No middleman
 - Liaisons with JTF
 - ° ATF operate as a single unit
 - Centralized control, decentralized effectiveness
 - Designated operating areas
 - Communications
- End-state
 - Turn over the relief mission to international agencies or the host nation
- Transition
 - Transparent

Table 6. Outline of data for Operation Sea Angel (continued)

Civil-military relations

- Who
 - Bangladesh government
 - NGOs
- What
 - Capabilities
 - Resource allocation
 - Medical care
 - Education on logistics to NGOs
 - Areas of operation
 - Division of labor
- Where
 - Chittagong
- How
 - Requirements meeting at JTF
 - °Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) liaison
 - °Regimental landing team
 - °Marine Air Group - 50
 - °CPG-3
 - NGOs submit distribution requirements to Bengali gov't for approval
 - Then submit to JTF

Table 7. Outline of data for Operation Restore Hope

Political considerations

- Influence for intervention
 - Nature of crisis
 - ° Cause of problem
 - Civil war in Somalia, anarchist state
 - Feuding clans, factions, and warlords used food as a weapon
 - Problem compounded by drought
 - Heavy violence
 - ° Symptom of problem
 - Relief supplies could not get through
 - Population was starving
 - View of crisis
 - ° Bush Administration
 - ° Congress
 - ° Media
 - ° American public
 - ° Relief community
 - ° State Department/OFDA
 - ° UN
- Diplomatic efforts
 - At first, UN was very slow to respond: Security Council reluctant to take on additional peacekeeping efforts; Organization of African Unity did not support a UN role; there was no Somalia government to request assistance
 - Relief agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP) had left Somalia
 - Boutros-Ghali (new Secretary General) got the UN involved
 - Two warlords controlling Mogadishu disagreed on UN support
 - Ali Mahdi wanted the UN involved; Aideed did not
 - UN passed Resolutions 775, established UNOSOM, April 1992
 - Limited force and capabilities were inadequate to deal w/ scope of problem
 - UN passed Resolution 794, 3 Dec 92: Chapter VII mandate for military intervention
 - The U.S. did not have an Ambassador or Country Team in country
 - U.S.-led effort for Provide Relief, airdrop relief supplies, Summer 1992
 - U.S.-led effort for Operation Restore Hope, under UN auspices
 - The U.S. and UN began with a contrasting approach for intervention
 - The UN wanted to disarm Somali militias and re-unify Somalia
 - The U.S. wanted to stop the starvation, but not intervene in Somali civil war
- Design of coalition
 - Strategic command relations
 - ° Other nations like France, Belgium, Italy joined the coalition based on their own domestic political and diplomatic concerns

Table 7. Outline of data for Operation Restore Hope (continued)

Military planning considerations

- Military's role
 - Balance of operational reality, politics, humanitarian goals
 - ° CINCCENT/I MEF planning cell recommended not using the military
 - ° Pressure on the Bush Administration to "do something"
 - ° Relief efforts were failing because of lawlessness and banditry
 - ° Assumed a semi-permissive environment, planners had to consider forcible entry and significant security force
 - ° The timeline would be event-driven not time-driven
 - ° Four-phase operation based on political objective of creating secure environment, assisting relief community, transition to UN control
 - 1) Secure major air and sea ports, key installations, food distribution points
 - 2) Provide open and free passage of relief supplies
 - 3) Provide security for convoys and relief organization operations
 - 4) Transition from a U.S.-led effort to the UN control
 - Operational Command Relations
 - ° CCJTF would not be dual-hatted, but would have coordinating authority w/ the UN commander
 - ° Coalition forces that helped secure sectors (some coalition effort only) were only allowed in future planning cell when that sector discussed
 - ° OPCON/TACON confused at this level, no negative effects
 - ° JTF provided some logistical support to coalition members
- End state
 - Interpreting/translating from political view
 - ° Phase 4 of the operation, transition to UN, UNOSOM II
 - ° Time line event-driven not time-driven
 - Balance of operational and strategic end states
 - ° The secure environment UNITAF created was not sustainable by the smaller UN force
- Transition
 - When NCA declared mission complete
 - Who
 - ° UNOSOM II
 - ° The UN is a slow bureaucracy
 - ° UN expanded its mandate (goal)
 - How
 - Created documents and documenting procedures
 - ° Some UNOSOM I officers had stayed; they were able to provide information on how the UN operates and serve as points of contact for the UNITAF staff; they also had expertise on Somalia
 - ° At the time JTF staff began strategic planning for the transition, UNOSOM II had only 5 staffers
 - ° Staff created a Joint Operations Center similar to the JTF one, easy transition

Table 7. Outline of data for Operation Restore Hope (continued)

Civil-military relations

•Coordination

—Who

- °NGOs
- °IOs
- °UN
- °Warlords
- °Civilians, clan elders
- °Coalition members

—How

- °HOC- coordinated the relief community
- °CMOC-military cell (UNITAF J3) key coordination between NGOs and the military
- °Oakley key role, tell military this was not combat Operations
- °During planning talked about need to coordinate and establish a cell
- °At first the CMOC was to gather intelligence, then its function was defined to coordinate and interface w/ relief organizations

Table 8. Outline of data for Operation Joint Endeavor

Political considerations

- Influence for intervention
 - Nature of crisis
 - °Root problem was civil/ethnic conflict
 - Civil war in former Yugoslavia, not humanitarian assistance
 - Military and politicians properly identify the problem
 - Warring factions needed to agree to peace agreement, before the U.S. would intervene
 - Agreement addressed stopping conflict, and rebuilding the country and infrastructure
 - °Symptoms of the problem, no justice system or police, refugees, no freedom of movement for the population
 - View of crisis
 - °Public outcry at the atrocities of the civil war
 - °Congress
 - °State Dept.
 - °Military-strategic
 - °UN
 - °International community
 - °Neighboring nations
 - °Relief community
 - °Ambassador
 - °Media
 - °Host nation government
 - °NCA, President Clinton said enough after Serb. massacre
 - °NATO
- Diplomatic efforts
 - Negotiated cease-fire agreement failed
 - EU/UN attempts to end civil war failed
 - Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke
 - Dayton Peace Accord
- Design of coalition (non-U.S.)
 - Strategic command relations

Table 8. Outline of data for Operation Joint Endeavor (continued)

Military planning considerations

•Military role

—Military concerns

- °Military planners had concerns they wanted addressed in the Dayton Peace Accord.
- °Planners had a U.S. channel to express their concerns
- °Military concerns were mostly addressed
- °Political control
- °Clear mission statement
- °Commander's freedom of action
- °Protection from and of civilian population
- °End-state definition (never defined, instead had end-date)
- °Length of mission
- °Relationship with non-military aspects and organizations
- °Separate Annex for military aspects
- °Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) was able to influence military annex of DPA
- °AFSOUTH J5 and Chief of Staff used an informal U.S. channel (would fax comments to LtGen. Wes Clark at Dayton)
- °AFSOUTH was successful in having their concerns addressed in the DPA, except for defining an end-state.

—Strategic military view

- °Keep military and civilian operations separate
- °Give military a narrow, clearly defined mission
- °Give civilian assistance portion to UN

—Operational reality vs. political view

- °Testing period: IFOR was tested by former warring factions (FWF), and IOs attempting to expand the interpretation of the military mission
- °IFOR worked to avoid mission creep, nation building, and the impression of favoring one faction over another
- °COMIFOR gave broad guidance to Commander, Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in accomplishing his mission
- °COMIFOR, on the other hand, had strict guidelines to accomplishing his mission
- °COMIFOR insisted DPA was a Parties peace, not NATO peace
- °Parties had responsibilities
- °The operation was peace implementation, not peace enforcement

—Command relations

- °This was a NATO operation sanctioned by a UN Security Council
- °In keeping the military and civilian aspects separate, the military component and appointed High Representative would be co-equal
- °COMARRC was the operational cdr. in charge of the ground forces
- °Three multinational divisions (U.S., British, French) provided framework; other nations' troops were under one of the three

Table 8. Outline of data for Operation Joint Endeavor (continued)

- End-state
 - Military never given a clear definition. Instead, U.S. politicians gave them an end-date. This helped the Clinton Administration sell the U.S. force commitment to Congress and American public
- Transition
 - Transfer military authority from IFOR to Stabilization Force (SFOR)
 - Transfer to SFOR because of slow progress of civilian reconstruction and continued ethnic friction
 - SFOR's primary tasks were IFOR's secondary tasks
 - Help create secure conditions for others to conduct non-military provisions of DPA
 - Assist UNHCR and other IOs in humanitarian missions
 - Assist in preventing interference of civilian Freedom of Movement (FOM), responding appropriately to deliberate violence
 - Assist in implementing arms control and regional stability measures

Table 8. Outline of data for Operation Joint Endeavor (continued)

Civil-military relations

- Military and civilian relationship
 - The military and the U.S. wanted to keep military and civilian sides separate
 - The military did not consider civilian tasks in its mandate and did not take the initiative to assist the civilian side. They "grew in to it"
 - COMIFOR used the escape clause creating a secure environment.
 - IFOR worked with Parties to implement the military part of peace agreement. They did not interact directly with Parties for civil implementation. This was to be mediated by High Representative (HR) or a designated international organization
 - IFOR's responsibility was to cooperate, coordinate, and provide a secure environment for HR and IOs/NGOs using a case-by-case approach
 - Assist only if it did not interfere with the military mission, had the resources, or endanger security of IFOR forces
 - In the first 90 days, SHAPE/IFOR/ARRC realized the need to increase support to civilian side if they were to meet the end-date
 - COMIFOR avoided expanding the mission. UN Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) experience showed him what to avoid
 - HR given a very broad mandate, but no authority to enforce or implement. No threat to enforce compliance
- Other participants
 - NATO forces led by U.S., non-NATO forces
 - European Union (EU), UNHCR, HR
 - Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks
 - Agencies to implement peace agreement: Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), International Tribunal for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Police Task Force (IPTF)
- Coordination
 - Coordinating with HR on COMIFOR and COMARRC levels
 - Coordination with NGOs/IOs occurred mostly at the ARRC level
 - Because of the separation, there was no strategic policy for coordinating assistance efforts with the civilian side, IFOR used a case-by-case approach.
 - CIMIC served as an information conduit/facilitator between IFOR and civilian side "lead IFOR mechanism in interface w/civilian organizations, IOs, party agencies"
 - CIMIC was a military cell w/in IFOR, but did not have its own policies/goals. "observed and then fitted in civil organization environment"

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